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Using the Benchmark and Annual Surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the authors examine the opera-
tions of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) in seven manufacturing indus-
tries and twenty-two countries over the years 1982–91.  They analyze how tariffs,
wages, and industrial relations environments influenced U.S. MNCs’ decisions
about where to locate assets and employment.  The results imply that wages and
the industrial relations environment were statistically significant determinants
of the extent to which MNCs located operations in a particular host country.
However, while these factors were important, their impact was much smaller
than that of host country market size, which was by far the main determinant of
MNC location decisions.  Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that tariff
reductions increased the share of U.S. MNC activities located abroad.  Thus,
concerns that tariff reductions may lead to loss of “American jobs” appear to be
exaggerated.
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1For instance, a spokesman for the AFL-CIO stated,
“A new trade agreement with Mexico . . . will only
encourage greater capital outflows from the United
States, bring about an increase in imports from
Mexico, and reduce domestic employment” (see
Anderson 1993:55).  See also Betcherman (1993) or
Robinson (1994).
ow multinational corporations
(MNCs) decide where to locate pro-
duction has been a subject of considerable
interest in recent years.  For example, in
the debate over the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. labor
unions and many politicians, as well as some
academics, expressed concern that trade
liberalization would cause U.S. MNCs to
move production facilities from the United
States to Mexico, so as to take advantage of
lower Mexican wages.1  The basic logic is
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that in the absence of U.S. tariffs, it would
in many instances be optimal for U.S. firms
to produce in Mexico, where labor costs are
lower, and then to ship finished products
back to the United States for sale.  Accord-
ing to this view, U.S. tariff walls provide an
important incentive for corporations to
produce within the United States those
goods intended for final sale in the United
States.
This raises the empirical question of just
how tariffs and cross-country wage differ-
entials affect the production location deci-
sions of MNCs.  Production location deci-
sions include how to allocate capital and
employment across countries, how much
output to produce in each country, and the
volumes of goods to ship between coun-
tries.  There now exists a large literature on
the factors that influence MNCs’ foreign
direct investment (FDI), employment, and
production in various countries.  Interest-
ingly, this work has typically found that
host country wages either are not a statisti-
cally significant determinant of MNCs’ pro-
duction location decisions or are a statisti-
cally significant determinant but with the
“wrong” sign.  That is, conditional on other
control variables, the correlation between
the amount of capital, employment, or pro-
duction MNCs locate in a country, and the
average wage rate in the country, is usually
found to be essentially zero or even positive
(see, for example, Swedenborg 1979; Dun-
ning 1980; Cooke 1997; Cooke and Noble
1998).2
Findings of zero or positive correlations
between MNC investments and wage rates
across countries have been viewed as anoma-
lous given the widespread expectation that,
ceteris paribus, returns on investment should
be greater in countries with lower labor
costs.  There are at least four potential
explanations for this anomalous finding.
First, if MNC organization is primarily “hori-
zontal” rather than “vertical,” meaning that
most FDI is driven by market access consid-
erations (rather than the desire to exploit
factor price differentials), we would expect
to see most FDI in large markets (that is,
industrialized high-wage countries).
A second possibility is that, if labor qual-
ity is much lower in low-wage countries,
then wages per efficiency unit of labor may
be relatively high in such countries.  Third,
unobserved (or unmeasured) characteris-
tics of countries that make them attractive
places in which to invest (such as favorable
factor endowments, low corruption, or
openness to FDI) may be positively corre-
lated with wage rates.  In the second and
third scenarios, the effect of the wage per
efficiency unit of labor on the attractive-
ness of a country as a production location is
in fact negative, but omitted variables may
lead to bias in the regression estimates of
the true effect.
A fourth possibility is that average wages
in foreign countries are not relevant for
MNC production location decisions.  An
MNC that uses a particular technology in its
production process may require workers
with particular skills.  In that case, even if
the average wage rate in a country is low,
the wage rate among the relevant set of
workers with the necessary skills to imple-
ment the production process may be high.
Under this fourth scenario, it may make
sense to view U.S. MNCs not as wage takers
in competitive labor markets in each host
country, but rather as bargaining over wages
with the set of workers possessing the nec-
essary skills to operate their production
processes.  In that case, the attractiveness
of a host country may be influenced by
features of its industrial relations (IR) envi-
ronment that affect bargaining outcomes,
such as union power and collective bar-
gaining structure.  Indeed, Ulman (1975)
and Carlton (1979) argued that firms avoid
investment in locations where unions are
powerful, independent of the wage rate.  A
key objective of this paper is to evaluate
whether features of the IR environment are
in fact important determinants of MNC
production location decisions.
Our paper contributes to the literature
by using industry-level panel data to exam-
2Of course, conditional on an MNC having chosen
to operate in a country, a positive wage effect on
capital can be easily rationalized, provided the substi-
tution effect dominates the scale effect.
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ine U.S. MNCs’ production location deci-
sions.  Specifically, we use data on the op-
erations of U.S. MNCs in seven manufac-
turing industries and twenty-two foreign
countries over the years 1982–91.  The data
are from the Benchmark and Annual Sur-
veys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
collected by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), plus a number of addi-
tional data sources that we have merged
with the BEA data.  In contrast, most
previous work in this area has used cross-
sectional data on MNC activities in a
single year, or used data aggregated to
the national level.
For example, a paper to which ours is
closely related is that by Grubert and Mutti
(1991a), who found, using data from the
BEA’s 1982 Benchmark survey aggregated
to the national level, that both corporate
tax rates and tariffs are important deter-
minants of U.S. MNCs’ production loca-
tion decisions (they did not, however,
examine the influence of wages or IR
factors).  Another related paper that used
country-level panel data, Kleiner and
Ham (2003), reported evidence that more
“progressive” IR systems do reduce FDI
flows.  As we discuss below, however, there
are important reasons to examine FDI
levels as well as flows.  The papers by
Cooke (1997), Cooke and Noble (1998),
and Cooke (2001) used cross-sectional
data at the country/industry level, and
found evidence that IR systems affect the
allocation of MNC assets across coun-
tries.  To our knowledge, our paper is the
first to use industry-level panel data to
address these issues.
The use of industry-level panel data to
study FDI is desirable for two reasons.  First,
panel data enable one to exploit the tem-
poral co-variation (within industries) be-
tween FDI and the covariates of interest in
order to better identify the effects of those
covariates (that is, these data provide infor-
mation beyond that in the cross-sectional
co-variation).
Second, there are likely to be unobserved
(or unmeasured) characteristics of particu-
lar countries that make them attractive as
locations for particular industries.  Ex-
amples are countries’ factor endowments,3
as well as differences in worker quality that
are not captured by observed characteris-
tics of the labor force.  But we are inter-
ested in how certain “generic country fac-
tors,” such as wages and features of the IR
environment, affect MNC production loca-
tion decisions.  If such generic factors are
correlated with unmeasured country char-
acteristics, then failure to control for coun-
try/industry effects will lead to inconsis-
tent estimates of wage and IR effects.  One
needs industry-level panel data to imple-
ment such controls.
As will become apparent when we present
our results, we find that controlling for
industry- and country-specific unobserv-
ables using panel data techniques does in-
deed lead to more reasonable estimates of
wage and other effects on MNC production
location decisions than have been obtained
in prior work.  This highlights the impor-
tance of using industry-level panel data to
study these questions.
Theoretical and Empirical
Literatures on MNC Behavior
To guide our empirical specifications,
we turn to the theoretical literature on
MNC behavior.  Markusen and Maskus
(2001, 2002) provide an excellent overview
of the current state of the literature.  They
divide theories of the MNC into those that
generate “vertical” versus “horizontal”
MNCs.  Vertical MNCs fragment the pro-
duction process across countries to take
advantage of factor price differentials, for
example, by locating unskilled labor-inten-
sive parts of the process in low-wage coun-
tries.  Horizontal MNCs basically replicate
the entire production process in multiple
countries, thus avoiding tariff and trans-
port costs.4
3For example, MNCs in the pulp, paper, and board
mills industry would presumably invest heavily in
Canada even if its business climate were not particu-
larly attractive, simply because of its substantial tim-
ber endowment.
4Theories of the MNC originated in the interna-
tional business literature, with the so-called “Owner-
174 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
These theoretical models generate clear
predictions for the set of variables we ex-
pect to have an important impact on FDI.
The vertical models obviously imply that
factor price differentials (wage differen-
tials, for example) between potential host
countries and the United States should be
important.  Vertical models also imply that
tariffs (as well as geographic distance and
transport costs) discourage FDI by prevent-
ing MNCs from exploiting factor price dif-
ferentials.  This predicted mechanism is
consistent with the notion that trade liber-
alization could cost U.S. jobs.
In contrast, horizontal models imply that
market size (that is, host country gross do-
mestic product) is the main factor driving
FDI, since market access is MNCs’ main
motivation.  The horizontal models also
imply that higher tariffs (and distance)
should encourage FDI because they increase
the advantage to locating production in the
host country.  Both vertical and horizontal
models imply that variables affecting the
cost of foreign operations (such as English
language, cultural openness, local corrup-
tion, corporate taxes, and the IR environ-
ment) should matter.
As Markusen and Maskus point out, if
U.S. MNCs direct most of their FDI toward
large countries with factor prices similar to
those in the United States, the horizontal
model will be the better predictor of FDI
patterns.  But if most FDI is directed toward
countries with very different factor prices
(for example, lower wages), the vertical
model is the better predictor.  Since our
goal is to focus on whether wages and IR
factors have an important impact on FDI,
without taking an a priori stand on whether
the vertical or horizontal model is most
appropriate, we simply include a rather
complete set of control variables that might
be relevant under one or the other model.
Feinberg and Keane (2003) presented
an estimable structural model of MNC be-
havior that guides the reduced form em-
pirical work here (as well as that in Feinberg,
Keane, and Bognanno 1998 and Feinberg
and Keane 2001).  Their model considers
an MNC with an affiliate in a single foreign
country.  The MNC chooses eight inputs,
{Kj, Lj, Mj , Nj }j=d,f, where K, L, M, N denote
capital, labor, raw materials, and interme-
diate inputs, respectively, and the j = d, f
subscript denotes whether the input is used
in the parent (domestic) or affiliate (for-
eign) production process.  The MNC also
chooses a level of exports (E) from the
parent to the host country, and of imports
(I) from the affiliate to the domestic mar-
ket.  The intermediate input Nd denotes a
part of the affiliate’s output that is shipped
back to the parent for further processing,
and conversely for Nf.  This model nests
both the vertical and horizontal models of
MNC organization.  A purely horizontal
MNC, for example, would have Nd = Nf = E =
I = 0, so the affiliate production process
replicates the parent’s, all parent output is
sold in the United States, and all affiliate
output is sold in the host country.
The ten MNC choice variables, as well as
any functions of those variables (like out-
put or sales), are endogenous in the model.
The MNC chooses these ten variables to
maximize profits, given a set of constraints
determined by the parent and affiliate pro-
duction functions, the wage rate, prices of
capital and materials, tariffs and transport
costs, and four demand functions for the
goods produced by the parent and affiliate
ship-Location-Internalization (OLI) paradigm”—see
Hymer (1976) and Dunning (1975).  In the OLI
theory, in order to rationalize FDI, an MNC must have
an “ownership advantage,” such as a superior produc-
tion process or a well-known brand name, which
enables it to compete with foreign firms in their own
markets (despite language barriers, communication
and transport costs, and so on).  The MNC must also
have an “internalization advantage”—see Rugman
(1985)—which makes FDI preferable to licensing.
For example, a licensee might steal production pro-
cess knowledge or dilute a brand name by skimping
on quality.  Finally, the MNC must possess a “location
advantage” that makes FDI preferable to serving for-
eign markets via exports.  In “horizontal” MNC mod-
els the location advantage arises from the desire to
jump the tariff wall or save on transport costs, or
because proximity to final customers is important
(for example, to provide service).  In contrast, in
“vertical” MNC models, the main purpose of FDI is to
fragment the production process across countries to
exploit factor price differentials, so tariffs discourage
FDI.
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(the domestic and foreign demands for the
good produced by the parent, and the do-
mestic and foreign demands for the good
produced by the affiliate).  The demand
functions are shifted by domestic and for-
eign gross domestic product (GDP).  Ex-
change rates enter the model implicitly by
altering the relative factor prices and out-
put prices in the two countries.  Any vari-
ables that affect MNC behavior through the
constraints are exogenous in the model.
Brainard (1995) also provided a useful
discussion of which variables are viewed as
exogenous in the dominant theoretical
models of MNCs.  These include transpor-
tation costs, tariffs, corporate tax rates, and
measures of income and market size for the
domestic and foreign markets.  In the
Feinberg and Keane (2003) structural
model these variables are also exogenous,
as are wages, the price of capital,5 and other
factor input prices.  Here we augment this
list of assumed exogenous variables to in-
clude national-level IR environment vari-
ables, which we argue may affect the firm’s
labor costs.  Additional factors entering
through costs of doing business in a host
country include English language profi-
ciency, cultural openness, and corruption
measures.
In this theoretical framework, the con-
struction of a valid reduced form equation
requires that one of the endogenous vari-
ables (or some function thereof) be re-
gressed on the complete set of exogenous
variables.  In contrast, in the FDI literature,
when authors have estimated equations in
which the dependent variables are such
quantities as MNCs’ assets, sales, employ-
ment, or output in various host countries,
they have commonly used as “explanatory”
variables such quantities as capital/labor
ratios, exports to the host country, R&D
spending, advertising expenditure, and firm
size.  But such “explanatory” variables are
jointly determined along with the MNCs’
decisions about production location and,
therefore, they are potentially endogenous.
The common practice of including mea-
sures of exports to a host country (E in our
notation) as a predictor of the level of MNC
assets located in that county (Kf in our
notation) has been rationalized by the ar-
gument that exports are an alternative to
FDI, and they therefore substitute for FDI.
However, by analogy, to include exports on
the right-hand side of a “reduced form”
equation to predict FDI (that is, Kf) is no
more appropriate than to include labor
input on the right-hand side of an equation
to predict demand for capital.  Rather, a
valid reduced form for FDI should include
on the right the complete set of exogenous
variables that may affect the cost of serving
the foreign market via either FDI or ex-
ports.  Examples of the former are wages
and the corporate tax rate in the foreign
country, and an example of the latter is the
foreign tariff rate.
With a few notable exceptions (see, for
example, Grubert and Mutti 1991a;
Cummins and Hubbard 1995; Brainard
1995; Cooke and Noble 1998), it is difficult
to find examples in the literature on MNC
production location decisions and FDI in
which authors have estimated valid reduced
forms in the sense that the explanatory
variables include only quantities that are
assumed exogenous in standard theoreti-
cal models of MNC behavior.
We turn next to a discussion of the de-
pendent variables of interest.  The most
obvious measure of FDI in a particular host
country is the capital of U.S. MNCs’ affili-
ates in that country (Kf in our notation).  Of
course, there are well-known problems with
measuring capital stocks.  We proxy for
affiliates’ capital stock using the assets of
majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs)
in a particular country, as reported by the
5We realize that in a richer model of capital invest-
ment decisions the price of capital is also endog-
enous, depending, for instance, on firm-specific capi-
tal adjustment costs, risk/return factors, and finan-
cial structure and how this interacts with taxes.  Fur-
thermore, in equilibrium the price of capital will be
correlated with aggregate productivity shocks that
are common to all firms.  We abstract from this
problem and simply control for aggregate-level deter-
minants of the cost of capital, like interest rates and
corporate tax rates, which are plausibly exogenous
from the perspective of individual firms (that is, if
productivity shocks are largely idiosyncratic).
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Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).6  We
then model the share of U.S. MNCs’ world-
wide capital stock (within each manufac-
turing industry) that is allocated to each of
22 potential host countries.
Working with shares has several virtues.
First, it enables us to avoid modeling the
determinants of the overall level of the
MNC capital stock.  This would obviously
require a dynamic model of investment
behavior, raising a host of serious compli-
cations that are tangential to our main
focus.  Instead, we focus on how the relative
attractiveness of potential host countries
(as determined by the set of assumed exog-
enous variables described earlier) affects
their share of MNCs’ worldwide capital
stock.7  Second, a related point is that work-
ing with shares alleviates some of the well-
known problems associated with finding an
appropriate price index to measure growth
of the real capital stock over time.  Third,
working with shares helps to alleviate
heteroskedasticity problems that typically
arise in a panel data context when one
pools data from industries or countries (or
both) that differ in size.  We discuss this
further below, under “Econometric Issues.”
Of course, our focus is not just on U.S.
MNCs’ allocation of capital to various po-
tential host countries, but also on MOFA
employment (Lf in our notation).  Also,
following earlier literature, we examine
another measure of the size of MNCs’ for-
eign operations:  the sales of U.S. MOFAs in
each host country, net of their imports
from the U.S. parent.  Again, we look at
specifications in which the dependent vari-
ables are specified as the shares of U.S.
MNCs’ worldwide employment or net sales
located in each host country.
We hasten to point out a key problem
with the net sales measure:  since sales
equals price times quantity, one cannot
interpret the coefficients on covariates in a
net sales regression as necessarily captur-
ing effects on scale of MNC operations.
Rather, the coefficients will capture the
effects of covariates on both the volume of
production and the price level.  To the
extent that the MNC has market power in
the host country (and theories of the MNC
imply that it should), a drop in local
production may lead to a higher price.
Still, since it has been common in FDI
literature to use net sales as a measure of
the size of MNCs’ local operations in
each host country, we look at this depen-
dent variable for the sake of comparabil-
ity with earlier studies.
We conclude this section with a specific
discussion of some earlier studies that fo-
cused on the role of wages and IR factors in
MNC production location decisions.  Karier
(1995) estimated equations for value added,
sales, and employment of foreign affiliates
of U.S. MNCs in 32 industries and 10 geo-
graphic regions, using data from the BEA’s
1982 benchmark survey.  He found that
unionization rates in host countries were
statistically insignificant in the value added
and sales equations, and actually were posi-
tive and statistically significant in the em-
ployment equation.  However, he included
capital-labor ratios, R&D, and advertising
expenditures as explanatory variables, all
of which we would argue are endogenous,
and this clouds the interpretation of the
results.  He did not control for wage rates or
unobserved country/industry effects (since
he used data for only one year).
Cooke (1997) examined data from the
1989 BEA survey.  He looked at assets of
6In contrast, many existing studies look at balance
of payments measures of FDI.  As Stevens (1972) and
Grubert and Mutti (1991b) pointed out, this is inap-
propriate for studying real investment decisions—
which is what we are interested in.  The problem is
that FDI financed by local borrowing in the host
country does not affect the balance of payments.  This
point is not just academic.  Grubert and Mutti found
that the correlation over time between the U.S. bal-
ance of payments measure of FDI in Canada and the
fixed investment expenditures of U.S. MNC affiliates
in Canada is essentially zero.  And Culem (1988)
found that FDI flows are driven by nominal interest
rate differentials.
7By analogy, in the consumption literature, it is
common to model shares of household spending allo-
cated to each category of goods, as a function of
relative prices of those goods, in a static framework.
This avoids the complex task of modeling the overall
level of consumption, which would require dynamic
modeling of saving behavior.
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U.S. MNC foreign affiliates in nine indus-
tries and nineteen industrialized host coun-
tries, and considered four IR factors:  the
unionization rate, decentralized bargain-
ing, layoff restrictions, and whether works
councils were required.  His results were
mixed:  centralized bargaining, hiring/fir-
ing restrictions, and higher unionization
rates were all associated with lower assets in
1989 (as expected), while work council re-
quirements were associated with higher
assets (which is unexpected).  When Cooke
and Noble (1998) extended this analysis to
a sample that included developing coun-
tries and also looked at employment, they
obtained similar results.  However, since
these papers used only one year of data,
they could not control for country/indus-
try effects.  Cooke found that wage rates
were statistically insignificant, even though
he used average education levels of coun-
tries to control for worker quality.  And
Cooke and Noble found the typical positive
coefficient on wages in both asset and em-
ployment equations (provided wages were
above a certain threshold level).8
As indicated in the introduction, one
plausible reason for obtaining the “wrong”
sign on wages in MOFA employment equa-
tions is failure to control adequately for
intrinsic differences in worker productivity
across countries.  Some authors try to ad-
dress this problem by using unit labor costs
rather than wage rates as measures of labor
costs (see, for example, Devereux and
Griffith 1996, or Erickson and Kuruvilla
1994).  But this is problematic, because
unit labor costs are themselves endogenous.
They depend in general on the production
technology of firms and their factor input
decisions.9  We argue that a better way to
deal with the problem is to use panel data
techniques to control for country-specific
unobservables that drive productivity dif-
ferences.
Data
Our data on assets, employment, and net
sales of U.S.-based MNCs and their major-
ity-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) come
from the Annual and Benchmark Surveys
of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, adminis-
tered by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).  These are the most comprehensive
available data on the activities of U.S.-based
MNCs and their foreign affiliates.
We use the BEA data on 7 manufacturing
industries and 22 countries for the years
1982–91.  The industries are food and kin-
dred products, chemicals and allied prod-
ucts, primary and fabricated metals, ma-
chinery and nonelectronic equipment, elec-
tronic equipment, transportation, and
“other.”  The 22 countries include 15 Euro-
pean countries, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, Korea, Mexico, and
Canada.  We chose these countries because
we were able to obtain complete data for
them on the IR and other control variables
of interest.  The BEA reports data on assets
and sales in U.S. dollars, based on average
spot exchange rates for the fiscal year.
Given our 10-year sample period, and
the fact that we use 7 industries and 22
countries, there are 1,540 total potential
observations on each dependent variable.
But the BEA suppresses data in cases where
the information might reveal the activities
of particular firms (in particular, if only
one or two U.S. MNCs have an affiliate in a
particular industry located in a particular
country).  Thus, the data actually contain
1,202 total observations on assets, 1,273 on
8More recently, Cooke (2001) examined the allo-
cation of FDI by MNCs of each of 16 OECD countries
among the other 15 OECD countries, using OECD
data from 1994.  He found that centralized bargain-
ing and layoff restrictions discourage FDI.  He at-
tempted to control for worker quality differences
using the average education level in each country.
But he still obtained an unexpected positive coeffi-
cient on the wage per year of education.
9For example, given a Cobb-Douglas technology y
= K α(βL)1-α, where β is efficiency units per unit of
labor, the firm sets wL/y = (1–α).  Thus, the unit labor
cost is (1–α), regardless of the wage per efficiency
unit (w/β).
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employment, and 941 on net sales.  We also
drop cells with zero values, leaving 1,150,
1,218, and 881 observations, respectively.
For manufacturing industries, the 22
countries in our sample account for over
80% of all U.S. MOFA sales and 70–76% of
all U.S. MOFA employment for this period.
Furthermore,  the sample countries
closely parallel the time-series pattern of
worldwide sales and employment of all
U.S. MOFAs in manufacturing indus-
tries.10  Thus, we doubt that including
other (smaller) countries as potential
targets of FDI would have much effect on
our results.
We model the production location deci-
sions of U.S. MNCs as depending on a set of
independent variables that capture the at-
tractiveness of both the United States and
the set of foreign host countries as produc-
tion locations.  These independent vari-
ables include U.S. and host country aver-
age manufacturing wage rates, corporate
tax rates, and tariff rates.  Proxies for U.S.
and host country market size and relative
demand, as well as transportation costs, are
also included, along with miscellaneous
macroeconomic variables meant to capture
time effects on costs of capital or demand.
Finally, we include a set of variables that
capture features of the IR environment in
the United States and each host country.
We next describe each of these variables.
Data on foreign and U.S. hourly manu-
facturing wages are obtained from the U.S.
Department of Labor (1993), and they
are converted into U.S. dollar values us-
ing nominal exchange rates.  They are
then put on a 1985 base using the U.S.
GDP deflator (the same is true of all
nominal variables described below).  To
conserve on parameters, we enter the
wage rates in ratio form, as the ratio of
the foreign wage to the U.S. wage.
Average corporate tax rates for the 22
foreign countries are constructed from the
BEA data, by calculating the percentage of
total affiliate income paid in taxes by coun-
try and by year.  We obtained U.S. corpo-
rate income tax rates from Cummins, Har-
ris, and Hassett (1995).  Differences be-
tween foreign tax rates and the U.S. tax rate
are then included in the model.
U.S. and foreign tariff rates are taken
from the International Data Base compiled
by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The ad valorem nominal tariff rates com-
piled by the WTO are industry average
rates, unweighted by imports.  Since the
BEA uses a system of ISI industry codes
based on 2- to 3-digit U.S. SIC codes, we
converted the 3-digit SITC codes used in
the WTO tariff data into 3-digit SIC codes,
and subsequently into the BEA’s ISI codes.11
Tariff rates are Most Favored Nation
duties because all 22 of the sample coun-
tries are members of GATT (the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs).  Partici-
pants in the Tokyo round of the GATT
agreed to implement an average one-third
tariff reduction in eight equal annual in-
crements beginning January 1, 1980 (see
Kowalczyk and David 1998).  Thus, tariff
rates set by the Tokyo Round apply to the
first six years of our data set, 1982–87.
There were no further major multilateral
negotiations until the Uruguay round,
which specified additional tariff reductions
beginning in 1995.  Thus, we use the initial
tariff levels from the Uruguay round to
measure tariffs in the years 1988–91.  An
exception is made in the case of Canada,
since the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) went into effect in 1989.  Thus,
rates specified by the FTA were used after
1989.  We include both current and five-
year leads of the U.S. and host country
tariff rates in our models, to account for the
10It is worth noting that MOFA total assets (in
manufacturing industries) grew rapidly from $213
billion in 1982 to $369 billion in 1991.  But total
employment showed no trend (that is, it fluctuated in
the 3.0–3.4 million range).
11To do this we use a concordance table published
by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1995) in U.S.
Exports and Imports of Merchandise (CD-ROM).  Tariff
rates for Mexico were not classified by U.N. SITC
codes but rather by Harmonized System codes, so the
concordance was made between Harmonized System
and BEA industry codes.
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possibility that current MNC decisions de-
pend on both current and anticipated fu-
ture tariffs.
Foreign and U.S. real GDP are used to
measure market size, which the “horizon-
tal” model of MNCs suggests should be a
key determinant of FDI.  To capture rela-
tive market size, we enter these variables in
ratio form (host country GDP divided by
U.S. GDP).  We also include the per capita
income ratio (host country PCI divided by
U.S. PCI).  This is meant to capture the
composition of demand (that is, the rise in
the demand for manufactured goods as per
capita income rises), but it should also help
capture cross-country differences in worker
productivity.
The earnings-to-price (EP) ratio for each
national stock market is obtained from data
sets compiled by Morgan Stanley Capital
International and International Finance
Corporation.  We include these EP ratios as
(arguably exogenous) determinants of the
cost of raising equity capital in each coun-
try, and enter the foreign-U.S. difference
in the model.12
The GDP, PCI, and EP ratio variables can
all be viewed more generally as a set of
controls for time-varying macroeconomic
factors that influence MNC location deci-
sions.  We include an overall time trend as
well, to capture omitted macroeconomic
factors that may be altering the share of
MNC assets, employment, and net sales
that occur abroad.
The geographic distance between the
United States and a host country is in-
cluded to capture transportation costs.  A
dummy variable indicating whether a coun-
try is a member of the European Commu-
nity (EC) is also included, in recognition of
the fact that locating a production facility
inside Europe enables a U.S. MNC to jump
the EC tariff wall, and also that location of
production in Europe may be relatively
easy due to cultural similarities.
We also include a “cultural openness”
variable, which measures the extent to which
a country is culturally varied and open to
foreign influence, and a “corruption” vari-
able that measures the extent to which
improper practices such as bribery prevail
in the public sphere.  These are both taken
from the World Competitiveness Report
(1992, 1990).
We characterize the IR environment of
each host country by five variables:  union
density, strike intensity, collective bargain-
ing structure, works councils, and layoff
restrictions.  Union density is meant to
capture the likelihood that an affiliate lo-
cated in a particular host country will be
unionized.  To the extent that U.S. MNCs
would prefer to operate non-union, they
will tend to locate production in countries
with relatively low union densities.  Union
densities for the OECD countries are taken
from Visser (1991).  For Singapore, Korea,
and Mexico, we refer to government re-
ports and Foreign Labor Trends (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor).  Since data on union den-
sities for all sample countries are only avail-
able for 1982, 1985, and 1988, the union
densities in those years are carried forward
for 1983–84, 1986–87, and 1989–91, re-
spectively.
The strike intensity variable is meant to
capture the potential cost of unionization
in terms of lost production.  It is measured
by the number of working days lost to strikes
per employee.  For OECD countries, we use
U.K. Department of Labor statistics on strike
intensity reported in Employment Gazette.
For non-OECD countries, the ILO’s Year-
book of Labor Statistics or government publi-
cations of the particular countries are used.
The collective bargaining variable mea-
sures the extent to which bargaining is
centralized (that is, largely conducted at
the national, regional, industrial, or occu-
pational level) versus decentralized (largely
12We do not attempt to include firm- (or industry-)
specific measures of the cost of capital because these
may be endogenous.  We assume that firm-specific
activities do not affect the return on equity at the
national level.  We abstract from the problem that the
overall level of FDI directed toward a country might
affect the price of capital in that country (or factor
prices more generally).  To deal with this sort of
endogeneity problem would require a worldwide gen-
eral equilibrium framework, taking us well beyond
the scope of our analysis.
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conducted at the firm or plant level).  We
expect U.S. MNCs to prefer one-on-one
negotiations with individual unions, rather
than a multi-employer framework.  We
measure centralization using an adapta-
tion of the Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
index, which is available for 16 of our 22
countries.  The index is on a scale of 0 to 6,
with 0 indicating the maximum degree of
centralization.  Calmfors and Driffill did
not classify Korea, Mexico, Greece, Portu-
gal, Singapore, and Spain, so we applied
the same criteria to classify them, using
descriptions given in Rothman, Briscoe,
and Nacamulli (1993), Commission of the
European Communities (1994), and
Torriente (1997).  Our classifications are
reported in Appendix Table A1.
Finally, the Works Council dummy vari-
able is set equal to one if works councils are
legally recognized or prevail in the coun-
try, as reported in Kleiner and Ay (1996),
and the Layoff Restriction dummy equals
one if the country requires employers to
notify the government and consult with
unions or works councils about layoffs, as
reported by Cooke and Noble (1998).  We
have rated countries that were not included
Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Sources.
Variable Definition and Source
MOFA total asset ratio U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates’ total assets in industry i,
country j, year t, divided by U.S. MNCs’ worldwide total assets in
industry i, year t.  Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce (1985–94).
MOFA total employment ratio U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates’ total employment in industry i,
country j, year t, divided by U.S. MNCs’ worldwide total employment
in industry i, year t.  Total employment is the sum of full-time and
part-time workers.  Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce (1985–94).
MOFA net sale ratio U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates’ net sales in industry i, country
j, year t, divided by U.S. MNCs’ worldwide net sales in industry i, year
t.  Net sales is total sales minus MOFA imports from the United States
and other countries.  Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce (1985–
94).
Wage ratio Ratio of the hourly compensation rate of manufacturing production
workers in host country j at time t to that in the United States at time
t.  Compensation is the sum of base pay and fringe benefits per hour.
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor (1993).
Union density Proportion of wage and salary workers in country j in year t who are
employed union members.  Source:  Visser (1991) and various
government reports of Asian countries.
Strike intensity Days lost per worker due to work stoppages in country j in year t.
Sources:  U.K. Department of Labor (1992) and ILO (1995).
Collective bargaining structure Degree of decentralization in bargaining structure.  Sources:  Calmfors
and Driffill (1988) and the authors’ own calculations.
Works councils Equals 1 if works councils are legally recognized or prevail in the host
country; equals 0 otherwise.  Source:  Kleiner and Ay (1996).
Layoff restrictions Equals 1 if country requires employers to notify government labor
office and consult with unions or works councils about layoffs; equals
0 otherwise.  Sources:  Cooke and Noble (1998) and authors’ own
calculations.
GDP ratio The ratio of host country GDP to U.S. GDP.  Sources:  OECD, National
Account—Main Aggregates (various years) and IMF, International
Financial Statistics Yearbook (various years).
Geographic distance Direct land and sea distance between capitals of the U.S. and foreign
countries.  Source:  Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).
Continued
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in Cooke and Noble’s study (see Appendix
Table A1).
Table 1 contains a complete list of vari-
able definitions, and descriptive statistics
are given in Table 2.  Appendix Table A1
gives the IR environment variables for each
country in our sample.
Table 3 presents the fraction of MOFA
assets and employment in each of the 22
sample countries in 1982 versus 1991.  The
striking impression conveyed by this table
is that the relative size of U.S. MNCs’ opera-
tions in the various countries is very stable
over the sample period.  For instance, for
the share of MNC employment located in
each host country, the top 8 ranked coun-
tries are identical in 1982 and 1991, and the
top 3 are all industrialized countries (the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany).
Thus, there is no overall pattern of move-
ment of MNC activities toward low-wage
countries during this period.  The one ob-
vious exception is Mexico:  the share of U.S.
MNCs’ worldwide employment located in
Mexico increased from 1.67% in 1982 to
2.86% in 1991, a substantial increase.  Nev-
ertheless, Mexico’s employment rank stays
fixed at 4.
Note, however, that the failure to see
MNC activities moving into low-wage coun-
tries over time has no bearing on the extent
to which MNCs prefer to locate in low-wage
countries.  As Grubert and Mutti (1991a)
pointed out in a different context, results
Table 1.  Continued.
Variable Definition and Source
English dummy Equals 1 if the country uses English as a native language; equals 0
otherwise.  Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom are coded as 1.
PCI ratio Ratio of host country per capita income to U.S. per capita income.
Source:  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(1982–93).
EC membership Equals 1 if the country is a member of the European Community;
equals 0 otherwise.  The European countries that were EC members
are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  The
European countries that were not EC members (during our sample
period) are Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Corporate income tax rate The host country corporate income tax rate in year t minus the U.S.
difference corporate income tax rate in year t.  Sources:  The percentage of total
affiliate net income paid as income taxes in country j in year t was
calculated from BEA annual and benchmark surveys.  For the U.S. tax
rates, see Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (1995).
Earnings-to-price ratio difference Difference between foreign and U.S. earnings-to-price ratio, for stock
market in host country j in year t.  Monthly ratios were averaged to
yearly ratios.  Source:  unpublished data from Morgan Stanley Capital
International and International Finance Corporation.
Cultural openness The extent to which the culture of a host country is open to foreign
influence.  Source:  IMD (1992).
Corruption The extent to which improper practices such as bribing prevail in the
public sphere.  Source:  IMD (1990).
Foreign tariff rate Ad valorem tariff rates in industry i, country j, and year t.
Source:  WTO (1995).
U.S. tariff rate Ad valorem tariff rates in industry i and year t.  Between U.S. and
Canada, FTA tariff rates were used after the year 1989.  Source:  WTO
(1995).
Time trend Ranges from 1 to 10 for the period 1982–91.
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for changes in assets and employment are
difficult to interpret because, in equilib-
rium, one would not see any association
between levels of exogenous variables and
changes in endogenous variables.  For ex-
ample, if relative wages across countries
were fairly stable during the sample period,
then lack of movement is consistent with a
scenario in which relative wages are a very
important determinant of MNC location
decisions, provided that the equilibrium
allocation of MNC activities across coun-
tries in 1981 already reflected this factor.
This highlights why a multivariate analysis
that exploits both cross-sectional and tem-
poral co-variation in FDI and its determi-
nants is essential in order to shed further
light on the determinants of MNC produc-
tion location decisions.
Econometric Issues
An important problem in panel data stud-
ies in which data for different countries,
industries, or both are combined is the
potential for heteroskedasticity.  This prob-
lem often arises because of intrinsic differ-
ences in size between the different coun-
tries or industries.  The variance of the
error terms (over time) tends to be much
greater for the larger industries or coun-
tries.  We found that heteroskedasticity was
indeed a severe problem in our data.
Typical methods for dealing with
heteroskedasticity often involve transfor-
mations that “rein in” large values of the
dependent variable (thus reducing skew-
ness).  Common examples are normalizing
by some measure of size, or taking logs.  In
our analysis, we normalize the dependent
variables by converting them to shares.  For
instance, for employment, the total MOFA
employment of each industry in each host
country is divided by the worldwide em-
ployment of U.S. MNCs in that industry.
Similar normalizations are done for MOFA
assets and net sales.
Conversion to shares substantially re-
duced the heteroskedasticity in our data,
but fell far short of eliminating it.  That is,
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Dependent Variables:
MOFA total asset ratio 0.94 1.20
MOFA total employment ratio 1.21 1.55
MOFA net sales ratio 1.43 1.68
Independent Variables:
Wage ratio (foreign/U.S.) 0.72 0.35
Foreign union density (% union member) 39.91 18.44
Foreign strike intensity (days per worker) 0.25 0.74
Collective bargaining structure 2.16 0.96
Works council 0.55 0.50
Layoff restriction 0.32 0.46
GDP ratio (foreign/U.S.) 0.07 0.08
Geographic distance (in 1000s of km) 6.57 3.26
English language dummy 0.26 0.44
Per capita income (foreign/U.S.) 0.67 0.30
European Community membership 0.52 0.50
Corporate tax rate difference –0.05 0.17
Earnings-to-price ratio difference –0.008 0.03
Cultural openness (1992) 60.49 10.95
Corruption (1990) 61.93 9.07
Foreign nominal tariff rate 10.82 15.42
U.S. nominal tariff rate 4.19 1.18
Time trend 5.64 2.87
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industry/country cells with relatively large
shares tend to have greater variability in
their shares over time.  A log transforma-
tion resulted in an over-correction:  indus-
try/country cells with smaller shares tend
to have greater variability in their log shares
over time.  Hence, we used a Box-Cox trans-
formation (intermediate between the log
and linear cases) to effect the degree of
skewness correction needed to eliminate
heteroskedasticity.
Thus, our estimating equations are of
the form
(1) (Y λict – 1)/λ = Xictβ + φic + εict,
where Yict is the dependent variable (share
of assets, employment, or net sales) for
industry i allocated to host country c in
year t, λ is the Box-Cox parameter, Xict is a
vector of (assumed) exogenous influences
on MNC behavior, φic is an industry/coun-
try-specific effect, and εict is an idiosyncratic
error component.  As λ → 0, we approach a
log transformation.
In the OLS specification, the φic are ig-
nored.  The random effects (RE) model
assumes that the φic are present but that
E(φic | Xic1 , …, XicT) = 0 (that is, there is mean
independence).  The fixed effects (FE)
model does not restrict the distribution of
the φic in this way.  If the RE assumption
holds, the RE effects estimator is consistent
and efficient.13  The OLS estimator is also
Table 3.  Shares of U.S. MNC Assets and Employment Located in Each Host Country.
MOFAs’ Share of Worldwide Assets MOFAs’ Share of Worldwide Employment
Host Country 1982 Rank 1991 Rank 1982 Rank 1991 Rank
Canada 2.76 1 2.79 2 3.34 2 3.14 2
United Kingdom 2.58 2 2.97 1 3.79 1 3.48 1
Germany 1.92 3 2.77 3 2.97 3 3.08 3
France 0.96 4 1.49 4 1.53 5 1.57 5
Italy 0.64 5 1.03 5 0.96 6 0.90 6
Netherlands 0.60 6 0.96 6 0.51 10 0.62 10
Mexico 0.52 7 0.42 11 1.67 4 2.86 4
Australia 0.45 8 0.57 8 0.67 8 0.73 8
Japan 0.39 9 0.39 12 0.35 11 0.64 9
Belgium 0.36 10 0.47 9 0.64 9 0.34 12
Spain 0.25 11 0.70 7 0.68 7 0.74 7
Ireland 0.20 12 0.42 10 0.23 13 0.30 13
Singapore 0.17 13 0.27 13 0.23 12 0.52 11
Sweden 0.08 14 0.06 15 0.09 15 0.13 15
Switzerland 0.06 15 0.05 17 0.11 14 0.04 18
Denmark 0.06 16 0.03 19 0.06 19 0.05 17
Austria 0.04 17 0.03 18 0.08 17 0.04 19
Greece 0.03 18 0.02 20 0.03 21 0.04 20
Portugal 0.02 19 0.05 16 0.08 18 0.07 16
New Zealand 0.01 20 0.02 21 0.05 20 0.04 21
Korea 0.01 21 0.08 14 0.09 16 0.15 14
Norway 0.004 22 0.003 22 0.01 22 0.02 22
Note:  The MOFA share of worldwide assets is the ratio of MOFA total assets in a host country to U.S. MNCs’
worldwide total assets (that is, parent plus MOFA assets).  Employment share is defined similarly.  The Bureau
of Economic Analysis denominates MOFAs’ assets and U.S. worldwide assets in U.S. dollars using annual average
exchange rates.
13Consistency of the RE estimator actually requires
the additional assumption of strict exogeneity,
E(εictXics) = 0 for all t,s.  The same is true of the FE
estimator.  Consistency of pooled OLS does not re-
quire this assumption.
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consistent in this case, but it is inefficient
and produces inconsistent standard errors.
However, one can construct robust stan-
dard errors (which we do).  On the other
hand, if the φic are correlated with the Xict,
only the fixed effects estimator is consis-
tent, and both OLS and RE are inconsis-
tent.
In our case, we would like the RE as-
sumption to hold, because if we must rely
Table 4.  Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates’ Total Asset Ratio.
Random Fixed Random Fixed
Variable OLS Effect Effect Variable OLS Effect Effect
Wage Ratio 1.974** 0.232 0.164
  (Foreign/U.S.) (0.243)a (0.120) (0.126)
Industrial Relations Variables:
Foreign Union –0.0029 –0.0025 –0.0021
  Density (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Foreign Strike –0.085** 0.006 0.006
  Intensity (0.031) (0.018) (0.019)
Collective Bargaining 0.117** 0.155 —
  Structure (0.042) (0.086)
Works Council –0.569** –0.042 —
  Dummy (0.146) (0.234)
Layoff Restriction –0.073 –0.256 —
  Dummy (0.120) (0.234)
F-Test for IR Variables:
F-Statistics (p-value)b 13.16** 7.69** 0.33
(0.000) (0.000) (0.718)
Control Variables:
GDP Ratio 38.214** 28.711** –5.193
  (Foreign/U.S.) (2.382) (4.151) (10.307)
Geographic Distance 0.111** 0.053 —
(0.014) (0.029)
GDP Ratio × Distance –3.685** –2.414** 1.715
(0.279) (0.513) (1.250)
English Dummy –0.504 0.461 —
(0.279) (0.256)
GDP Ratio × English 5.590** 6.354 2.898
(1.322) (3.286) (16.168)
PCI Ratio –2.148** –0.093 0.050
  (Foreign/U.S.) (0.258) (0.139) (0.152)
EC Dummy 0.345* 0.341 —
(0.161) (0.183)
PCI Ratio × EC 0.255 0.524** 0.626**
(0.203) (0.121) (0.129)
PCI Ratio × English 0.830* 0.165 0.258
(0.390) (0.180) (0.200)
Corporate Income
  Tax Rate
  Difference –0.060 –0.093 –0.163
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.186) (0.081) (0.086)
Earnings-to-Price Ratio
  Difference 4.041** 0.619 0.193
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.782) (0.339) (0.348)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bCritical values of the F-test are 2.21 for OLS and random effect models and 3.00 for the fixed effect model.
cOmitted industry is “other.”
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.
Control Variables (continued):
Cultural Openness 0.028** 0.047** —
(0.004) (0.007)
Corruption –0.007 –0.023* —
(0.005) (0.011)
Foreign Nominal 0.006 0.032** 0.029**
  Tariff (0.017) (0.007) (0.008)
Foreign Nominal –0.010 –0.032** –0.059**
  Tariff (+5) (0.018) (0.008) (0.012)
U.S. Nominal Tariff –0.030 0.077* 0.101**
(0.079) (0.037) (0.038)
U.S. Nominal 0.372** 0.048 0.017
  Tariff (+5) (0.073) (0.032) (0.034)
Time Trend 0.046** 0.048** 0.037**
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Industry Dummy 1 0.749** 0.382 —
  (Food)c (0.123) (0.211)
Industry Dummy 2 1.215** 0.730** —
  (Chemical) (0.163) (0.217)
Industry Dummy 3 0.724** 0.098 —
  (Metals) (0.188) (0.227)
Industry Dummy 4 1.229** 0.625** —
  (Equip.) (0.147) (0.215)
Industry Dummy 5 0.207* –0.016 —
  (Elect.) (0.095) (0.203)
Industry Dummy 6 0.162 –0.239 —
  (Transport) (0.165) (0.226)
Constant –5.978** –5.421** —
(0.629) (0.883)
No. of Observations 1,150 1,150 1,150
Box-Cox Lambda 0.2 0.2 0.2
LM-Statistics (p-value) 0.67 0.09 0.14
(0.412) (0.763) (0.708)
Hausman Test (critical
  value= 7.96 ) — — 74.67**
F Test for Significance — — 62.37**
  of Fixed Effects (p-value) (0.000)
R-Square 0.78 0.75 0.98
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on the FE estimator, then the coefficient
on any country characteristic that is con-
stant over time is not identified—and this
applies to three of our five IR environment
variables.  We can test whether the RE
assumption holds using a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test (see Hausman 1978).
While this test is often treated as definitive, it
is important to recognize that it is actually
only valid under a strong set of auxiliary
assumptions that are tangential to the RE
versus FE distinction.  Thus, we will advocate
a more pragmatic approach to choosing be-
tween the RE and FE specifications that also
considers the a priori reasonableness of the
estimates produced by each model.  As a
practical matter, in order to minimize the
importance of the unobserved φic , we should
control for as many observed (exogenous)
country characteristics as possible.
The Box-Cox parameter λ was chosen in
an effort to minimize heteroskedasticity in
the error terms εict.  We test for heteroskedas-
ticity using the Breusch-Pagan LM test.  It is
useful to find a common value of λ that
eliminates heteroskedasticity in the OLS,
RE, and FE models, because only then are
the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates
comparable across models.14  We were in
fact able to do this for assets, employment,
and net sales (see Appendix Table A2).
Empirical Results
Our main estimation results, which use
either the share of MOFA assets or employ-
ment (by industry) located in each host
country as the dependent variable, are re-
ported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
Appendix Table A2 describes the grid search
we used to settle on a Box-Cox parameter
for each dependent variable.  As the results
in Appendix Table A2 show, homoskedas-
ticity was overwhelmingly rejected (by the
Breusch-Pagan LM test) for both linear and
log specifications for all dependent vari-
ables.  We settled on a Box-Cox parameter
of 0.20 for MOFA assets and 0.45 for MOFA
employment.  These values eliminate any
statistically significant heteroskedasticity.
In Tables 4 and 5 we first report OLS
results, in which the data for all countries,
industries, and time periods are simply
pooled.  The fit of the OLS regressions is
quite good.  The R-squared values are .78 in
the asset share equation and .80 in the
employment share equation.  These R-
squared values are unusually high for cross-
country/cross-industry regressions of this
general type.  Thus, the covariates that we
have included in our models appear to do
a good job of explaining the allocation of
U.S. MNC assets and employment across
countries.
The OLS coefficient estimates are, for
the most part, not surprising.  Notably, they
indicate that market size is a very important
determinant of the share of MNC opera-
tions located in each host country (for ex-
ample, the coefficient on the ratio of host
country to U.S. GDP is 38.2 in the asset
share equation, with a standard error of
only 2.4).  Table 6 presents a list of effect
sizes implied by each of the estimates.  Ef-
fect sizes measure the change (in standard
deviations) of the dependent variable asso-
ciated with a one standard deviation change
in an independent variable.  Hence, they
provide measures of the influence of each
independent variable that are adjusted both
for the units in which the variable is mea-
sured and for the variability of that variable
in the sample.15  The figures in Table 6
14Also, the usual method for implementing the
DWH test relies on the assumption that, under the
null hypothesis that the RE assumption is valid, the
RE estimator is efficient.  This means we should chose
λ to eliminate heteroskedasticity under the RE speci-
fication in order to implement the test.  The FE
model must be estimated using exactly the same λ,
since the choice of λ affects the scale of the coeffi-
cients and the DWH test is based on a comparison of
RE- and FE-estimated coefficients.
15In contrast, elasticities adjust for units but not
for variability.  Effect sizes, unlike elasticities, can be
compared across independent variables to get a feel
for the relative importance of each variable in gener-
ating the in-sample variation of the dependent vari-
able.  We have adjusted the effect size estimates so
they measure effects on the dependent variable itself
at the mean of the data, as opposed to the Box-Cox
transform of the dependent variable.
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indicate that the GDP ratio and the GDP
ratio interacted with geographic distance
have substantially larger effect sizes than
any of the other covariates.  The finding
that host country market size is the main
determinant of FDI is quite standard, and,
as noted by Markusen and Maskus (2001,
2002), it is consistent with “horizontal” MNC
models.
Given that our main focus is on the wage
Table 5.  Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates’ Total Employment Ratio.
Random Fixed Random Fixed
Variable OLS Effect Effect Variable OLS Effect Effect
Wage Ratio 1.469** –0.363** –0.424**
  (Foreign/U.S.) (0.192)a (0.108) (0.113)
Industrial Relations Variables:
Foreign Union –0.0038 –0.0016 –0.0013
  Density (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Foreign Strike –0.083** 0.004 0.005
  Intensity (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
Collective Bargaining 0.070 0.140* —
  Structure (0.036) (0.070)
Works Council –0.348** 0.185 —
  Dummy (0.126) (0.202)
Layoff Restriction –0.465** –0.603** —
  Dummy (0.104) (0.201)
F-Test for IR Variables:
F-Statistics (p-value)b 17.44** 10.54** 0.18
(0.000) (0.000) (0.833)
Control Variables:
GDP Ratio 42.170** 34.739** –3.223
  (Foreign/U.S.) (2.008) (3.656) (9.266)
Geographic Distance 0.113** 0.063* —
(0.012) (0.026)
GDP Ratio × Distance –4.433** –3.425** 1.211
(0.236) (0.450) (1.112)
English Dummy –0.764** 0.295 —
(0.239) (0.223)
GDP Ratio × English 8.680** 8.401** 0.983
(1.164) (2.861) (14.664)
PCI Ratio –2.118** 0.133 0.308*
  (Foreign/U.S.) (0.212) (0.124) (0.135)
EC Dummy 0.406** 0.548** —
(0.142) (0.160)
PCI Ratio × EC 0.008 0.062 0.175
(0.168) (0.107) (0.114)
PCI Ratio × English 0.818* 0.002 0.109
(0.336) (0.164) (0.182)
Corporate Income
  Tax Rate
  Difference 0.387* 0.010 –0.101
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.160) (0.071) (0.076)
Earnings-to-Price Ratio
  Difference 2.991** –0.688* –1.163**
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.657) (0.291) (0.299)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bCritical values of the F-test are 2.21 for OLS and random effect models and 3.00 for the fixed effect model.
cOmitted industry is “other.”
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.
Control Variables (continued):
Cultural Openness 0.013** 0.030** —
(0.003) (0.006)
Corruption –0.010* –0.023* —
(0.004) (0.010)
Foreign Nominal –0.014 –0.0003 –0.005
  Tariff (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign Nominal 0.018 0.010 –0.026*
  Tariff (+5) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011)
U.S. Nominal Tariff –0.087 0.066* 0.100**
(0.068) (0.034) (0.034)
U.S. Nominal 0.324** –0.023 –0.057
  Tariff (+5) (0.063) (0.029) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.028** 0.044** 0.030**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Industry Dummy 1 0.347** –0.044 —
  (Food)c (0.103) (0.182)
Industry Dummy 2 0.885** 0.393* —
  (Chemical) (0.138) (0.187)
Industry Dummy 3 0.710** 0.072 —
  (Metals) (0.160) (0.196)
Industry Dummy 4 1.040** 0.424* —
  (Equip.) (0.124) (0.185)
Industry Dummy 5 0.513** 0.209 —
  (Elect.) (0.078) (0.172)
Industry Dummy 6 0.534** 0.034 —
  (Transport) (0.138) (0.193)
Constant –3.171** –3.117** —
(0.538) (0.752)
No. of Observations 1,218 1,218 1,218
Box-Cox Lambda 0.45 0.45 0.45
LM-Statistics (p-value) 3.73 0.15 3.44
(0.053) (0.698) (0.063)
Hausman Test (critical
  value = 7.96) — — 113.48**
F Test for Significance of — — 60.04**
Fixed Effects (p-value) (0.000)
R-Square 0.80 0.75 0.98
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and IR environment variables, we will com-
ment only briefly on the other control vari-
ables.  As expected, cultural openness has a
positive effect, and corruption a negative
effect, on the share of assets or employ-
ment located in a host country (although
corruption is not statistically significant in
the OLS asset equation).  The finding that
the host country corporate tax rate is posi-
tively related to the share of MNC employ-
ment located in a host country is surpris-
ing, especially given the results of Grubert
and Mutti (1991a).  As we will see below,
however, this result vanishes when we go to
a random or fixed effects model.  We in-
cluded four interaction terms in the model
that considerably improved fit.16  These
imply, for instance, that host country GDP
and English language are complements in
terms of attracting MNC assets.  The own
coefficient on geographic distance is posi-
tive, but the negative interaction with GDP
implies that, at the mean of GDP, the effect
of distance is negative (that is, according to
the OLS estimates, the effect of distance is
0.111–3.685([GDP ratio], and the mean
GDP ratio is 0.07).  Regarding tariffs, note
that there is no theoretical prediction, be-
cause horizontal MNC models imply that
tariffs encourage FDI, while vertical mod-
els imply that they discourage it.
Not surprisingly, given past research, the
OLS results imply a positive association be-
tween the host country average wage in
manufacturing and the size of U.S. MNC
operations in the country (measured by
either assets or employment).  The wage
coefficient in the employment equation is
1.469 with a standard error of .192.  Accord-
ing to the effect size estimates in Table 6,
this implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the host country wage would
increase the share of MNC worldwide em-
ployment allocated to a country by .377
standard deviations.  At the mean of the
data, this implies an increase from 1.21% to
1.79%—a 48% increase.  Viewed another
way, this corresponds to a wage elasticity of
demand for labor of positive 0.97 at the
mean of the data.17  This is clearly an anoma-
lous result.
We turn now to the other key variables of
interest in this study, namely, the IR envi-
ronment measures.  The OLS estimates
imply that U.S. MNCs prefer to locate pro-
duction in countries with low strike inten-
sity, decentralized bargaining, and no works
councils or layoff restrictions.  Host coun-
try union density is not statistically signifi-
cant in either the asset or employment
equation.  To give an idea of the magni-
tudes implied by the estimates, in the asset
equation, the point estimate for decentral-
ized bargaining (0.117) implies that a one
standard deviation increase in the measure
of decentralization (0.96 points) would in-
crease the share of MNC assets in a particu-
lar host country by 0.089 standard devia-
tions (see Table 6).  This is a 0.11 percent-
age point increase, which corresponds to a
12% increase at the mean of the data (re-
call from Table 1 that the mean percentage
of assets in each host country is 0.94%).
The OLS results also imply that works
councils have very important negative ef-
fects.  The point estimate of –.569 in the
asset equation implies that a shift to having
works councils would reduce the share of
MNC assets located in a country from 1.28%
to 0.72% at the mean of the data.  This
estimate is so large that it may strain cred-
ibility.  According to the effect size esti-
mates in Table 6, works councils explain
the most variation in assets among the IR
variables, and the second most variation in
employment (being slightly less important
than layoff restrictions).
Next, we report estimates of a fixed ef-
fects model in which each of the industry/
16If the four interaction terms are dropped, the R-
squared in the asset equation drops from .78 to .71,
while that in the employment equation drops from
.80 to .68.
17Given our Box-Cox specification, the elasticity of
Y with respect to X is given by β × X × Y λ. Using the
mean wage ratio (0.72), the mean employment share
(1.21), and λ = 0.45, this gives the elasticity of 0.97 at





























Table 6.  Effect Size.a
MOFA Total Asset Ratio MOFA Total Employment Ratio MOFA Net Sales Ratio
Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed
Variable OLS Effect Effect OLS Effect Effect OLS Effect Effect
Wage Ratio (Foreign/U.S.) 0.551 0.065 0.046 0.377 –0.093 –0.109 0.128 –0.016 –0.030
Foreign Union Density –0.043 –0.036 –0.031 –0.053 –0.022 –0.017 –0.014 –0.015 –0.016
Foreign Strike Intensity –0.050 0.004 0.003 –0.058 0.003 0.003 –0.017 0.001 0.002
Collective Bargaining Structure 0.089 0.118 — 0.048 0.098 — 0.016 0.021 —
Works Council Dummy –0.225 –0.016 — –0.124 0.066 — –0.027 0.046 —
Layoff Restriction Dummy –0.027 –0.095 — –0.154 –0.200 — –0.017 –0.047 —
GDP Ratio (Foreign/U.S.) 2.463 1.851 –0.335 2.504 2.063 –0.191 0.711 0.480 –0.191
Geographic Distance 0.288 0.136 — 0.268 0.150 — 0.102 0.039 —
GDP Ratio × Distance –2.008 –1.315 0.934 –2.234 –1.726 0.610 –0.585 –0.339 0.295
English Dummy –0.176 0.161 — –0.237 0.091 — –0.036 0.073 —
GDP Ratio × English 0.149 0.170 0.077 0.205 0.198 0.023 0.029 0.051 0.090
PCI Ratio (Foreign/U.S.) –0.514 –0.022 0.012 –0.466 0.029 0.068 –0.119 0.020 0.037
EC Dummy 0.137 0.135 — 0.146 0.197 — 0.069 0.035 —
PCI Ratio × EC 0.073 0.150 0.179 0.002 0.016 0.046 –0.012 0.045 0.056
PCI Ratio × English 0.202 0.040 0.063 0.177 0.0004 0.024 0.069 0.011 0.013
Corporate Income Tax Difference –0.008 –0.013 –0.022 0.047 0.001 –0.012 0.005 –0.001 –0.003
Earnings-to-Price Ratio Difference 0.111 0.017 0.005 0.074 –0.017 –0.029 0.024 –0.003 –0.008
Cultural Openness 0.245 0.412 — 0.107 0.236 — 0.067 0.113 —
Corruption –0.051 –0.168 — –0.066 –0.151 — –0.013 –0.057 —
Foreign Nominal Tariff 0.070 0.390 0.354 –0.140 –0.003 –0.051 –0.091 0.117 0.118
Foreign Nominal Tariff (+5) –0.117 –0.370 –0.685 0.177 0.099 –0.256 0.087 –0.110 –0.190
U.S. Nominal Tariff –0.028 0.072 0.095 –0.074 0.057 0.085 0.023 0.018 0.023
U.S. Nominal Tariff (+5) 0.340 0.044 0.016 0.271 –0.019 –0.047 0.089 0.022 0.014
Time Trend 0.105 0.110 0.085 0.058 0.091 0.062 0.057 0.049 0.043
Industry Dummy 1 (Food) 0.223 0.114 — 0.091 –0.012 — 0.059 0.025 —
Industry Dummy 2 (Chemical) 0.365 0.219 — 0.239 0.106 — 0.133 0.061 —
Industry Dummy 3 (Metals) 0.203 0.028 — 0.181 0.018 — 0.092 0.017 —
Industry Dummy 4 (Equip.) 0.350 0.178 — 0.269 0.110 — 0.124 0.056 —
Industry Dummy 5 (Elect.) 0.060 –0.004 — 0.132 0.054 — 0.039 0.006 —
Industry Dummy 6 (Transport) 0.038 –0.057 — 0.117 0.007 — 0.042 –0.011 —
aThe effect size is calculated using the formula βY–1–λ(σx/σy), where λ is the Box-Cox parameter and Y– is the mean of the dependent variable.
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country pairs is treated as a cross-sectional
unit with its own intercept.  By including
industry/country-specific intercept terms
in the model, the fixed effects specification
ignores the cross-sectional covariance of
the dependent and independent variables,
and identifies the model coefficients purely
from the over-time covariance.  As a conse-
quence, independent variables that are
constant over time (within an industry/
country pair) drop out.  This is problem-
atic, because three of the IR variables of
interest (decentralized bargaining, works
councils, and layoff restrictions) drop out.
The fixed effects estimates are radically
different from the OLS estimates.  For ex-
ample, the fixed effects estimates indicate
that there is no statistically significant asso-
ciation between the size of U.S. MNCs’
operations in a host country, as measured
by assets or employment, and host country
GDP.  This means that as the ratio of host
country to U.S. GDP changes over time, the
share of U.S. MNCs’ assets or employment
allocated to that country does not vary sig-
nificantly.  It would, of course, be highly
implausible to argue that host country size
is not a key determinant of FDI location
decisions in the long run.  This is an ex-
ample in which neither OLS nor fixed ef-
fects are giving us the “right” answer, but
where, instead, each is answering a differ-
ent question.
The anomalous wage effects noted ear-
lier are no longer present in the fixed ef-
fects specification.  In the employment equa-
tion, the wage coefficient is –.424 with a
standard error of .113.  This implies that a
one standard deviation increase in the host
country to U.S. wage ratio would lower the
share of MNC employment located in that
country by .109 standard deviations (see
Table 6).  At the mean of the data this
implies that a 49% wage increase would
decrease the host country employment
share from 1.21% to 1.04%—a 14% de-
crease.  The implied wage elasticity of labor
demand is –0.28.  The fact that the wage
coefficient switches to the “right” sign when
we move from OLS to fixed effects suggests
that the potential bias in the wage coeffi-
cient resulting from the failure to control
for industry/country effects, which we dis-
cussed in the introduction, is in fact impor-
tant.
In the fixed effects asset equation, the
wage coefficient is still positive, but much
smaller in magnitude and no longer statis-
tically significant.  This can be rationalized
if substitution and scale effects on MOFAs’
demand for capital roughly cancel, so that
when host country wages rise MOFAs’ capi-
tal stocks remain roughly constant.  In-
deed, Cummins and Hassett (1996) found
evidence of strong substitutability between
MOFA capital and employment.  Thus, once
we control for unobserved industry/coun-
try effects, the wage coefficient takes on
theoretically plausible values in both the
asset and employment equations.  Hence, it
seems likely that unobserved country ef-
fects that make high-wage countries desir-
able places to locate assets drive the large
positive effect of wages on employment
implied by OLS.
Only two IR environment variables—
union density and strike intensity—are iden-
tified in the fixed effects specification, be-
cause these are the only two that vary over
time.  Neither variable is statistically signifi-
cant in either the asset or employment
equation.  One concern is potential col-
linearity between these two variables, such
that their separate statistical insignificance
conceals joint statistical significance.  How-
ever, in Table 7 we report correlations of
several key variables, and these show that
union density and strike intensity are only
slightly negatively correlated (–0.069).
Moreover, the joint F-tests reported in
Tables 4 and 5 show that these IR variables
are not jointly statistically significant in
either the asset or employment equations.
These results imply that there is no statisti-
cally significant association between changes
in the IR environment in a host country (in
terms of union density or strike activity)
and changes in the fraction of worldwide
assets or employment that U.S. MNCs lo-
cate in that country.
The fixed effects results leave no doubt
that there are important unmeasured in-
dustry/country effects in these data, mean-
ing unmeasured country- and industry-spe-
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cific idiosyncratic factors that make par-
ticular countries attractive locations for
particular industries.  The inclusion of in-
dustry/country-specific intercepts causes
the R2 for the asset model to increase from
.78 to .98, and that for employment to
increase from .80 to .98.  Thus, the unmea-
sured industry/country effects, which pre-
sumably include such things as factor en-
dowments, account for at least 20% of the
variance of U.S. MNCs’ decisions about
how to allocate assets and employment
across various host countries.18  The factors
we have measured and included in the
model, such as GDP, geographic distance,
wages, the IR environment, cultural open-
ness, and so on, can account for at most
80% of the variance.  This is actually quite
a large proportion of variance to be ex-
plained by observables in a cross-country/
cross-industry regression.
The fact that adding industry/country-
specific intercepts substantially improves
model fit does not necessarily mean that
fixed effects should be the preferred speci-
fication.  A key issue is whether the unmea-
sured industry/country effects are corre-
lated with the determinants of MNC pro-
duction location that we have measured
and included in the model.  If not, then the
fixed effects estimator is inefficient (be-
cause it does not exploit the lack of corre-
lation between the unmeasured effects and
the regressors), and it needlessly causes
loss of identification of the time-invariant
regressors.  In this case, it may be prefer-
able to use a random effects model.
In the random effects model each indus-
try/country pair is again treated as having
its own intercept, in order to capture indus-
try/country-specific unobservables.  In the
random effects specification, however, the
industry/country effects are assumed to be
mean independent of the observed
covariates.  In that case, the unobservables
create serial correlation of the residuals
within each industry/country pair.  Thus, it
is appropriate to use a GLS procedure that
accounts for the serial correlation in the
errors.  The random effects estimator, which
implements this GLS procedure, is effi-
cient because it optimally weights the infor-
mation in the cross-sectional and over-time
variation in the data.  Unlike fixed effects,
the random effects estimator does not throw
away all the information contained in the
cross-sectional variation in the data.  How-
ever, it in effect down-weights that informa-
tion relative to OLS, because it recognizes
that, due to serial correlation, we do not
really have T independent cross-sectional
observations on each industry/country pair.
As we see in Tables 4 and 5, the fixed and
random effects estimates are dramatically
different.  Most obviously, the random ef-
fects estimates imply that GDP, and its in-
teractions with geographic distance and
English language, are very important de-
terminants of the share of MNC assets and
employment located in a country.  At the
mean of the data, a 1% increase in the GDP
ratio is predicted to raise the share of MNC
assets allocated to a country by 1.36% if it is
English-speaking, and 0.91% if not.19  These
appear to be very plausible estimates.
The wage coefficients also appear plau-
sible in both the asset and employment
equations.  The coefficient on wages is
statistically insignificant in the asset equa-
tion.  In the employment equation the point
estimate is –.363 with a standard error of
.108.  This implies an elasticity of labor
demand at the mean of the data of –0.24.
Thus, the random effects estimate of the
18Note that the increase in the R-squared when we
include the fixed effects only gives a lower bound on
the fraction of variance explained by unobserved
time-invariant characteristics of countries.  It is of
course possible that some portion of the variance
“explained” by variables we have measured and in-
cluded in our models is spurious, meaning that it only
arises because these variables are correlated with the
excluded unobserved country characteristics.
19According to the point estimates in Table 4, the
elasticity of assets with respect to GDP is given by
[28.71 – 2.41×D+6.35×E]×G×A–0.2, where D, E, G, and
A denote distance, English, GDP ratio, and asset
share, respectively.  Plugging in means from all vari-
ables (see Table 2), we obtain an elasticity of 0.91 if E
= 0 and 1.36 if E = 1.
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wage coefficient is similar to the fixed ef-
fects estimate, and both are far from the
anomalous OLS estimate.
The IR environment variables are not
individually statistically significant in the
asset equation.  However, the joint F-test
for these variables is 7.69, which is highly
statistically significant.  As we see in Table
7, some moderately high correlations are
present among the IR variables.  Layoff
restrictions and works councils are posi-
tively correlated (.58), layoff restrictions
and union density are negatively correlated
(–.47), and decentralized bargaining is
negatively correlated with both union den-
sity (–.44) and works councils (–.35).  This
collinearity does not seem severe, but it
complicates sorting out the relative influ-
ence of each variable.
Nevertheless, all the point estimates for
the IR variables look reasonable in the asset
equation.  The decentralized bargaining
variable comes closest to statistical signifi-
cance at the 5% level.  Its point estimate is
.155 with a standard error of .086.  The
point estimate implies that at the mean of
the data, a one standard deviation increase
in the measure of decentralization (0.96
points) would increase the share of MNC
assets in a particular host country by 0.118
standard deviations (see Table 6).  This is a
0.14 percentage point increase, which cor-
responds to a 15% increase at the mean of
the data (recall that the mean percentage
of assets in each host country is 0.94%).
The point estimates also imply that layoff
restrictions are quite important.  Their in-
troduction is predicted to reduce the share
of MNC assets allocated to a host country
from 1.08% to 0.84% at the mean of the
data—a 23% reduction.
In the employment equation, the bar-
gaining decentralization and layoff restric-
tion coefficients are individually statisti-
cally significant.  The point estimate im-
plies that, at the mean of the data, a one
standard deviation increase in the measure
of decentralization (0.96 points) would in-
crease the share of MNC employment allo-
cated to a particular host country by 0.098
standard deviations (see Table 6).  This is a
0.15 percentage point increase, which cor-
responds to a 13% increase at the mean of
the data (recall that the mean percentage
of employment in each host country is
1.21%).  The estimated effect of layoff re-
strictions is larger.  At the mean of the data,
the point estimates imply that introduction
of layoff restrictions would reduce the share
of MNC employment allocated to a host
Table 7.  Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables.
Collective Cultural
Wage Union Strike Bargaining Works Layoff Open-
Ratio Density Intensity Structure Council Restrictions ness
Union Density 0.3185
(0.0000)a
Strike Intensity –0.1479 –0.0688
(0.0000) (0.0131)
Collective Bargaining –0.1163 –0.4422 –0.1634
  Structure (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Works Councils 0.2304 0.0859 0.0908 –0.3495
(0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0000)
Layoff Restrictions –0.1969 –0.4705 0.2037 0.1601 0.5805
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cultural Openness 0.0309 –0.0414 –0.0071 –0.1758 –0.0643 0.0462
(0.2656) (0.1360) (0.7981) (0.0000) (0.0205) (0.0959)
Corruption 0.1189 0.1467 –0.1733 –0.1588 –0.4743 –0.6263 0.2887
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
aFigures in parentheses are p-values.
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country from 1.44% to 0.80%—a 44% re-
duction.
The works council variable, which was
the most important IR factor according to
the OLS estimates, appears to be much less
important according to the random effects
estimates.  In our view, the OLS estimate of
the effect of works councils seemed implau-
sibly large, so the random effects estimates
seem more credible.
The estimated coefficients of the control
variables in the random effects specifica-
tion also look reasonable.  For instance, the
estimates imply that cultural openness en-
courages MNCs to allocate assets and em-
ployment to a host country, while corrup-
tion discourages FDI.  According to the
effect size estimates in Table 6, these are
among the more important factors explain-
ing the variation in asset and employment
shares across countries.
The disparity between the fixed and ran-
dom effects estimates leaves us in a quan-
dary as to which specification to prefer.  A
common way to choose between them is the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test.  The
logic of this test is that, under the null
hypothesis that the unit-specific effects are
mean independent of the covariates, both
the fixed and random effects estimators are
consistent (although fixed effects is ineffi-
cient because it ignores the cross-sectional
covariance in the data).  However, under
the alternative that correlation is present,
the fixed effects estimator remains consis-
tent, while the random effects estimator
becomes inconsistent.  Thus, the degree of
similarity or dissimilarity between the ran-
dom and fixed effects estimates can be
construed as evidence of the extent to which
the unmeasured effects are, respectively,
uncorrelated with the regressors or corre-
lated with them.
The DWH test statistic values are 74.67
for the asset models and 113.48 for the
employment models.  Under the null, these
statistics are distributed as χ2 random vari-
ables with 16 degrees of freedom (since
there are 16 common parameters between
the fixed and random effects specifica-
tions), so the 5% critical value is 7.96.  Thus,
the DWH overwhelmingly rejects the ran-
dom effects specification.  This outcome is
not surprising, since we have already noted
the striking differences between the fixed
and random effects estimates.  It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this result is not
conclusive.  The DWH test relies critically
on the assumption that any differences be-
tween the random effects and fixed effects
estimates are due only to correlation be-
tween the unit-specific effects and the
covariates.  In the present context, how-
ever, it seems likely that other factors are
important.
As we noted earlier, the most striking
difference between the random and fixed
effects results is that the fixed effects esti-
mates imply that host country GDP is not a
statistically significant determinant of U.S.
MNC assets and employment allocated to
that country.  This strikes us as completely
implausible.  What might account for this
result?  As long as there are costs to adjust-
ing the level of assets or employment that
an MNC maintains in a particular host coun-
try, short-run changes in GDP that MNCs
perceive as transitory should have little af-
fect on MNC decisions (see Das, Roberts,
and Tybout 2001).  Thus, it is not at all
surprising that the fixed effects estimate of
the effect of GDP, which relies exclusively
on short-run covariation, would be close to
zero.  On the other hand, the cross-sec-
tional variation in GDP across host coun-
tries is dominated by permanent or long-
lived differences.  If MNCs are responsive
to these, as seems likely, then the random
effects estimator, which does incorporate
the cross-sectional variation in the data,
will imply that GDP is an important deter-
minant of MNC decisions.
More generally, the supposition that any
difference between the random and fixed
effects estimates stems solely from correla-
tion between the unit-specific effects and
the covariates relies on the implicit assump-
tion that the dependent variable responds
in the same way to permanent and transi-
tory changes in covariates.20  This seems
20Keane and Wolpin (2002) made this point in a
different but perfectly analogous context.  They con-
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highly implausible in the present context.
In particular, the same argument we made
for why this is not true for GDP applies for
aspects of the IR environment as well.  For
example, suppose strike intensity exhibits
substantial permanent differences across
countries (very high in Greece and low in
Norway, say), and also exhibits transitory
variation over time within countries.  Given
adjustment costs, it is unlikely that a transi-
tory increase in strike activity would lead an
MNC to reduce the assets it allocates to a
particular host country, even if the MNC’s
long-run decisions are quite sensitive to the
average level of strike activity in a country.21
In light of these considerations, we pre-
fer the random effects specification over
the fixed effects specification, precisely
because we are more interested in the ef-
fects of long-lived or permanent differences
in wages and the IR environment on MNC
location decisions than on the effects of
more transitory developments.  The ran-
dom effects specification does have the
problem that, if the unit-specific effects are
correlated with the covariates, the estimates
may be inconsistent.  However, to counter
this concern, we appeal to the fact that we
have included quite a rich set of control
variables in our models.  Indeed, the frac-
tion of variance explained by our measured
covariates (78–80%) is very high relative to
levels achieved in most panel data studies.
Thus, unobserved unit-specific effects may
be a less important source of bias here than
they often are in panel data work.  We also
appeal to the fact that our random effects
estimates have considerable face validity.
This is the only specification in which all
the statistically significant estimated coeffi-
cients have quite reasonable signs and mag-
nitudes.
In summary, our preferred random ef-
fects estimates support a conclusion that
both wages and the IR environment are
important determinants of U.S. MNCs’ pro-
duction location decisions.  While some
mild collinearity problems make it difficult
to sort out the relative importance of all the
IR factors we have examined, the clearest
evidence seems to be that U.S. MNCs prefer
to locate assets and employment in host
countries with decentralized bargaining
structures and with no important restric-
tions on layoffs.
We have reserved until now any detailed
discussion of the tariff coefficients.  In the
random effects specification, the current
U.S. and host country tariff coefficients are
statistically significant and positive in the
asset equation, and the current U.S. tariff
coefficient is statistically significant and
positive in the employment equation.  The
fixed effects results are similar.  Thus, there
is no support for the notion that tariff
reductions increase FDI.  The failure to
find statistically significant positive effects
of trade liberalization on FDI is consistent
with the finding that market access (“jump-
ing tariff walls”) is the main factor driving
FDI (the horizontal model).
Theory suggests that the vertical model
should better explain FDI in relatively low-
wage countries like Mexico, while the hori-
zontal model should better explain FDI in
high-wage countries (which account for
most U.S. FDI).  Thus, interactions be-
tween tariffs and wages should be impor-
tant.  That is, higher tariffs should encour-
age FDI in high-wage countries while dis-
couraging FDI in low-wage countries, lead-
sidered a model of welfare program participation in
which single mothers are eligible for welfare benefits
until their child reaches age 18.  In the model, women’s
decisions about whether to become single mothers
depend on the average level of welfare benefits they
expect to prevail during the period until a child
reaches 18.  Hence, their decisions are quite insensi-
tive to transitory fluctuations in benefits.  Using simu-
lated data from this model, Keane and Wolpin showed
that a fixed effects model falsely implies that women’s
decisions about whether to become single mothers
are insensitive to welfare benefits.  As Keane and
Runkle (1992) discussed, another reason for differ-
ences between the random and fixed effects estima-
tors is failure of the strict exogeneity assumption that
underlies both estimators.  If that assumption fails,
then both are inconsistent, and the DWH test is
uninformative.
21It is interesting that the random and fixed effects
estimates of the wage coefficient are quite close.  This
could be rationalized if the labor input is indeed
quite variable in the short run (in contrast to capital).
In that case, the responses of employment to perma-
nent and transitory wage changes may not differ
greatly.
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ing to a negative linear coefficient on tariffs
and a positive coefficient on the interac-
tion with the host country wage rate.  When
we included such interactions, they were
completely statistically insignificant in the
asset equation.  But the expected sign pat-
tern did emerge in the employment equa-
tion (although magnitudes of the negative
linear terms were small).  This result is
consistent with the notion that trade liber-
alization with a single low-wage country like
Mexico, where FDI is more likely to be
motivated by factor price differentials,
would lead to an increased share of U.S.
MNCs’ employment being located in that
country.  However, if trade liberalization is
a worldwide trend, we would expect, given
our results, that it would reduce the overall
share of U.S. MNCs’ employment located
abroad.
Finally, in Appendix Table A3 we report
results for net sales for the sake of compa-
rability with several earlier studies that ex-
amined this variable.  The results are broadly
similar to our results for assets and employ-
ment.  OLS estimates imply that the size of
MNC operations in a host country as mea-
sured by net sales is strongly positively re-
lated to the host country wage rate.  But this
anomalous finding is reversed when we
control for unobserved country/industry
effects using either a random or fixed ef-
fects specification.  OLS and random ef-
fects estimates imply that host country GDP
is the major factor driving MNC location
decisions, while the fixed effects estimates
produce the implausible result that host
country market size is unimportant.  The
set of IR environment variables is not jointly
statistically significant in the net sales equa-
tion, but as we noted in the introduction,
we view the net sales results as relatively
uninformative, because sales equal price
times quantity.  Thus, how the covariates
affect sales does not tell us directly how
those covariates affect the scale of MNC
operations.
Conclusion
We have examined the production loca-
tion decisions of U.S. MNCs, using BEA
industry level data on U.S. MNC operations
in 22 countries over 10 years (1982–91).
Four main conclusions emerge.
First, we find evidence that the IR envi-
ronment does have statistically significant
effects on U.S. MNCs’ production location
decisions.  U.S. MNCs prefer to locate pro-
duction in foreign host countries with a
decentralized bargaining structure and
without appreciable restrictions on layoffs.
Our preferred random effects model esti-
mates imply that if a host country is one
standard deviation above average in terms
of our measure of decentralization, the
share of U.S. MNC assets allocated to that
country will be, ceteris paribus, 15% higher.
The corresponding figure for employment
is also 15%.  Our estimates imply that the
introduction of important layoff restric-
tions would, ceteris paribus, reduce the shares
of assets and employment allocated to a
particular host country by 23% and 44%,
respectively.  Other features of the IR envi-
ronment, like union density, strike inten-
sity, and works councils, do not appear to
be as important.
Second, we conclude that the prior
literature’s dominant and anomalous find-
ing of a positive or zero association be-
tween a host country’s wage rate and MNCs’
allocation of employment to the country is
due largely to the tendency to identify the
wage coefficient purely from cross-sectional
variation, and the failure to control for
industry/country-specific unobservables.
Indeed, we find that wage coefficients in
models for MNCs’ allocation of employ-
ment to a country switch sign from positive
to negative when we control for industry/
country effects using either a random ef-
fects or fixed effects specification.  Thus,
contrary to most prior studies, we find that
U.S. MNCs do prefer to locate employment
in low-wage countries, ceteris paribus.  Our
preferred random effects estimates imply
that the elasticity of employment with re-
spect to host country wages is –0.24.
Third, while we find that both wages and
the IR environment are important, it is
worth emphasizing that by far the most
important determinant of MNC produc-
tion location decisions appears to be sim-
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ply host country GDP (that is, market size).
This finding is consistent with horizontal
models of MNCs.  Other variables with
statistically significant influence were
cultural openness,  corruption, geo-
graphic distance, corporate tax rates, and
tariffs.  Our complete set of covariates
explains a very large share of the varia-
tion in U.S. MNCs’ production alloca-
tion across countries (with the R-squared
values in our asset and employment equa-
tions being 78–80%).
Fourth, we find no evidence that tariff
reductions would lead to significant in-
creases in the share of U.S. MNC assets and
employment located abroad.  In fact, our
estimates imply the reverse.  This is again
consistent with the horizontal MNC model,
in which market access is the main factor
driving FDI, so that tariff reductions actu-
ally discourage FDI.  The concern—fre-
quently expressed in the debate over
NAFTA—that trade liberalization would
lead to an increased share of MNC employ-
ment being located abroad may be exag-
gerated, since the vertical model, in which
the exploitation of factor price differen-
tials drives FDI, explains a relatively small
part of FDI.
The key importance of stable factors like
relative market size implies that trade liber-
alization is unlikely to lead to any sudden
and substantial shifts of U.S. MNC opera-
tions toward countries with lower wages or
more favorable IR environments, despite
our findings that these factors are impor-
tant.  As further evidence for this conclu-
sion, we also found that the allocation of
U.S. MNC operations across host countries
changed little between 1982 and 1991, de-
spite the tariff reductions in the Tokyo
round of the GATT that took effect from
1982 though 1987.  Thus, it appears that
the allocation of U.S. MNC operations (that
is, capital and employment) across foreign
countries and the U.S. has been in some-
thing close to an equilibrium position for
many years, and that the factors we con-
sider are only leading to small and gradual
shifts in that equilibrium.
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Appendix Table A1
Industrial Relations Environment Indicators
Union Strike Degree
Density Intensity of
(Averaged (Averaged Bargaining Works Layoff
Country over 1982–91) over 1982–91) Decentralization Councils Restriction
Australia 55.43 252 2 0 0
Austria 61.43 7 0 1 0
Belgium 54.60 45 2 1 0
Canada 35.20 428 4 0 0
Denmark 76.00 143 1.33 1 0
France 15.77 64 1 1 1
Germany 36.07 31 1.67 1 0
Greece 32.40 3,630 0 1 1
Ireland 61.67 318 1.67 0 0
Italy 43.63 492 2.67 1 1
Japan 28.93 8 3 0 0
Korea 14.97 306 4 1 1
Mexico 29.00 218 3 0 0
Netherlands 29.67 20 1.67 1 1
New Zealand 48.13 386 2 0 0
Norway 56.57 100 1 1 0
Portugal 46.80 106 2 1 1
Singapore 22.43 0 1 0 0
Spain 18.00 582 2 1 1
Sweden 83.10 83 1 0 0
Switzerland 28.50 5 3 0 0
United Kingdom 45.90 272 2.67 0 0
Note:  For strike intensity we report days lost per thousand workers, but days lost per worker is included in the
regressions.
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Appendix Table A2
LM Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics under Alternative Box-Cox Transformations
Dependent
Variable Asset Share Employment Share Net Sales Share
Box-Cox Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Transform Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects
Parameter OLS Model Model OLS Model Model OLS Model Model
1.0 209.86 318.69 216.12 68.55 209.63 64.90 143.57 301.13 134.17
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.9 102.87 253.28 102.34 39.05 181.33 35.03 135.48 294.01 115.71
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.8 54.45 190.92 56.82 28.35 152.85 26.07 104.85 239.47 87.21
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.7 13.66 114.72 16.38 15.16 113.34 15.49 65.59 168.13 51.97
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.6 0.11 39.21 0.01 3.32 63.37 5.54 26.05 88.75 18.22
(0.739) (0.000) (0.908) (0.068) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.5 11.06 1.02 8.68 0.53 16.55 0.24 2.87 24.41 0.80
(0.001) (0.314) (0.003) (0.469) (0.000) (0.622) (0.090) (0.000) (0.372)
0.45 15.81 1.69 13.51 3.73 3.44 0.15 0.05 6.71 0.38
(0.000) (0.193) (0.000) (0.053) (0.063) (0.698) (0.817) (0.010) (0.536)
0.4 15.68 8.84 14.12 8.21 0.02 1.20 0.59 0.23 3.07
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.887) (0.273) (0.441) (0.628) (0.079)
0.3 4.90 12.88 5.27 10.72 2.61 2.56 0.63 2.00 5.23
(0.027) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.106) (0.110) (0.429) (0.157) (0.022)
0.2 0.67 0.14 0.09 2.71 2.87 0.49 2.64 3.33 0.22
(0.412) (0.708) (0.763) (0.100) (0.09) (0.482) (0.104) (0.068) (0.635)
0.1 16.03 19.42 9.48 0.98 51.94 1.18 23.64 68.32 6.53
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.321) (0.000) (0.278) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Log(y) 44.79 61.60 33.19 12.04 139.48 9.09 51.59 143.12 30.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note:  p-values are in parentheses.
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Appendix Table A3
Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates’ Net Sales Ratio
Random Fixed Random Fixed
Variable OLS Effect Effect Variable OLS Effect Effect
Wage Ratio 1.864** –0.239 –0.430**
  (Foreign/U.S.) (0.298)a (0.153) (0.163)
Industrial Relations Variables:
Foreign Union –0.0041 –0.0046 –0.0049
  Density (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0044)
Foreign Strike –0.191** 0.014 0.025
  Intensity (0.061) (0.035) (0.038)
Collective  Bargaining 0.087 0.112 —
  Structure (0.054) (0.093)
Works Council –0.277 0.463 —
  Dummy (0.181) (0.266)
Layoff Restriction –0.184 –0.515 —
  Dummy (0.144) (0.265)
F-Test for IR Variables:
F-Statistics (p-value)b 5.79** 0.46 0.69
(0.000) (0.809) (0.499)
Control Variables:
GDP Ratio 45.022** 30.400** –12.069
  (Foreign/U.S.) (2.889) (4.625) (12.492)
Geographic 0.149** 0.056 —
  Distance (0.017) (0.032)
GDP Ratio × –4.394** –2.547** 2.217
  Distance (0.340) (0.571) (1.526)
English Dummy –0.398 0.804** —
(0.333) (0.286)
GDP Ratio × English 4.009* 7.008* 12.254
(1.554) (3.448) (17.752)
PCI Ratio –2.091** 0.351* 0.647**
  (Foreign/ U.S.) (0.330) (0.173) (0.194)
EC Dummy 0.705** 0.360 —
(0.217) (0.206)
PCI Ratio × EC –0.160 0.624** 0.765**
(0.261) (0.153) (0.169)
PCI Ratio × English 1.067* 0.171 0.194
(0.447) (0.209) (0.235)
Corporate Income
  Tax Rate
Difference 0.154 –0.039 –0.107
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.226) (0.100) (0.107)
Earnings-to-Price Ratio
Difference 3.621** –0.455 –1.148**
  (Foreign – U.S.) (0.980) (0.424) (0.440)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bCritical values of the F-test are 2.21 for OLS and random effect models and 3.00 for the fixed effect model.
cOmitted industry is “other.”
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.
Control Variables (cont’d):
Cultural Openness 0.031** 0.053** —
(0.005) (0.008)
Corruption –0.007 –0.030* —
(0.006) (0.012)
Foreign Nominal –0.039 0.050** 0.050*
  Tariff (0.027) (0.016) (0.020)
Foreign Nominal 0.038 –0.049** –0.084**
  Tariff (+5) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019)
U.S. Nominal Tariff 0.097 0.077 0.100*
(0.087) (0.041) (0.042)
U.S. Nominal 0.385** 0.096** 0.063
  Tariff (+5) (0.080) (0.037) (0.039)
Time Trend 0.101** 0.087** 0.075**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.011)
Industry Dummy 1 0.895** 0.375 —
  (Food)c (0.152) (0.222)
Industry Dummy 2 1.762** 0.802** —
  (Chemical) (0.197) (0.230)
Industry Dummy 3 1.248** 0.228 —
  (Metals) (0.230) (0.242)
Industry Dummy 4 1.725** 0.780** —
  (Equip.) (0.181) (0.227)
Industry Dummy 5 0.515** 0.080 —
  (Elect.) (0.116) (0.218)
Industry Dummy 6 0.686** –0.175 —
  (Transport) (0.200) (0.244)
Constant –7.662** –5.833** —
(0.842) (0.979)
No. of Observations 881 881 881
Box-Cox Lambda 0.2 0.2 0.2
LM-Statistics (p-value) 2.64 0.22 3.33
(0.104) (0.635) (0.068)
Hausman Test
(critical value = 7.96 ) — — 98.18**
F-Test for Significance of 50.01**
Fixed Effects (p-value) — -— (0.000)
R-Square 0.79 0.73 0.98
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